The Stillborn Singapore Welfare State

By Ho Chi Tim

In June 1959, the International Labour Office (ILO)¹ published the Report to the Government of Singapore on a Proposed Social Security Scheme. The highlight of the report was a draft bill to introduce a comprehensive social insurance scheme in Singapore. It also included administrative guidance to establish a new social security department to administer the scheme. If implemented, insured workers and their families would receive cash benefits during times of sickness, maternity, death (of the breadwinner), old age, and (at a later date) unemployment. If implemented, it would have meant the establishment of a welfare state in Singapore.

But the scheme never came to pass. Despite plans at an advanced stage, the Singapore welfare state was never delivered and died stillborn. The ILO report however did mark the high point of open discussions in Singapore concerning the “cradle to grave” protection of ordinary workers and their families throughout the 1950s. Those discussions also signalled the final break from the laissez-faire principles that guided the development of the British trading settlement after 1819, moving Singapore to a situation where government actively intervened to ensure the general well-being of society, i.e. social welfare. This article examines the circumstances that encouraged the Colonial Office to assume responsibility for their colonies’ welfare, and discusses the developments and plans to establish the welfare state in Singapore after the Second World War.

The Welfare State and Social Welfare

Generally associated with state dependency, the term ‘welfare state’ has a decidedly less than favourable reputation in contemporary Singapore. Such a perception however oversimplifies a complex history of ideas and actions addressing a fundamental question of how state and society interacts over social needs. The welfare state is moreover a historical product of particular contexts and circumstances, and needs to be approached as such (Esping-Anderson, 1992). The British ideal of the welfare state, for instance, can locate its origins in the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601, was fundamentally affected by the European “long nineteenth century” (Hobsbawm, 1996, p. 13), and was finally conceived in the fires of the Second World War. Examining the historical development of the British welfare state, social historian Asa Briggs (1961) defines the welfare state as “a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions... (p. 228).” The first guarantees “individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of their market value of their work or their property (p. 288).” The second narrows “the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain “social contingencies” (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead otherwise to individual and family crises (p. 288).” The third ensures “that all citizens without distinction of status or class differences are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services” (p. 288). In other words, a guiding hand redistributing resources, not just to protect society from certain social contingencies, but to also provide an optimal standard of living to create a fair society.

As such, the history of the British welfare state is inseparable from the (European) historical evolution of civil rights (e.g. freedom of speech), to political rights (e.g. the right to vote), and social rights (e.g. the right to “economic welfare and security”) (Marshall, 2009).

While “welfare” or “social welfare” are commonly understood as the dole, we would stand to glean more if they are perceived as part of a system that provides social services to ensure the “general well-being” of society (Spicker, 1998, p. 3). There are six recognised social services: health-care, education, housing, employment-training, income transfers (or social security), and personal social services (Kahn & Kamerman, 1977, pp. 2–3). A 1944 publication entitled Welfare in the British Colonies indicated a similar perspective, and significantly also highlighted the novelty of government undertaking responsibility for social welfare as it defined social welfare to include “those aspects...which are not the special interest or concern of other Departments” (Mair, 1944, p. 101). This ambiguous catch-all definition does affect scholarship examining social welfare in Singapore, which tend to fall back on the more recognisable social services of education, healthcare, housing as well as the Central Provident Fund (CPF).² What follows below complements existing scholarship by presenting the context and circumstances surrounding the attempts to introduce social security and social welfare in late colonial Singapore³ – the impact of which continues to be felt today.

Colonial Singapore Before Second World War

A historian of the British welfare state noted that it’s development was not a smooth “unfolding of some great scheme of progress as increasingly enlightened men approached ever onward and upward a future promised land” (Fraser, 2003, p. 1). Instead, it was more an “erratic and pragmatic response of government and people to the practical individual and community problems of an industrialised society” (p. 1). The manner in which social services evolved in Singapore, state-provided and otherwise, was similar. Colonial Singapore before the Second World War was governed along laissez-faire principles of free trade and minimal governance. Singapore was administered on the cheap, as the British “laissez-faire policy and the absence of taxes and restrictions [on trade]...led to deficiencies of government, particularly in the provision of security and social services.” (Turnbull, 2009, p. 68). Colonial laissez-faire policies inadvertently fostered a plural society in Singapore, where a common social will was all but absent (Furnivall, 1948). This resulted in a reversed tug-of-war not just between state and society, but also between different societal groups.

Such a situation was obvious in the protracted establishment of the Pauper Hospital – the forerunner to present-day Tan Tock Seng Hospital, and the Chinese Protectorate. The planning and eventual administration of both institutions suffered from ambivalent colonial governance as well as reticence from certain sections of Singapore’s colonial society. For instance, the European community wanted no part of the financial burden imposed in the construction of a hospital that they felt would cater predominantly to the Chinese (Lee, 1978, pp. 78–80). The Europeans also opposed the Chinese Protectorate on the basis it was not cost-efficient (nor ethical) to create a government agency for a specific section of society (Thio, 1960).

The colonial government had to be forced into action in both instances. The donation made by Tan Tock Seng in 1844 was meant for “erecting a suitable building for the support and accommodation of [the] unfortunate beings” and on the condition that “sufficient pecuniary means are furnished for their support and proper maintenance of the land.” (Lee, 1978, p. 100). Although construction was completed in 1847, it was not until 1849 when the government finally took formal ownership of the building as the original Pauper Shed was destroyed by a storm (Lee, 1978). The process of establishing the Chinese Protectorate in 1877 was similarly prolonged, spanning the better part of two decades. Despite repeated petitions from the Chinese business community, the colonial government only took action after it became unavoidably clear that newly-arrived Chinese sinkehs were brazenly herded away by traffickers in broad daylight (Lee, 1991, p. 77).

The legacy of the Chinese Protectorate, particularly for a history of social welfare in Singapore, is yet to be fully appreciated.⁴ The Protectorate was arguably the first example of direct state intervention to ensure the welfare of Singapore’s colonial society (albeit a targeted section), the beginnings of a gradual shift from the laissez-faire colonial policy to a more paternalistic approach (Wee, 2011; Lee, 1991). From the late nineteenth century to the Second World War, the colonial government established agencies such as the Municipal Commission in 1887,⁵ the Singapore Improvement Trust in 1927,⁶ and even provided cash relief in the form of the Silver Jubilee Fund in 1936 (“Jubilee Fund: Committee Appointed to Deal With Cases”, April 3, 1936).⁷ The Chinese Protectorate’s initial objective to ensure the safety and protection of the Chinese coolie also expanded over time, to include the forerunners of welfare services, such as dispute mediation and the protection of women and girls.⁸ Those functions and services were later adopted by the new Department of Social Welfare when it was established in June 1946. The initial head of the Department, and several of his successors, also hailed from the Chinese Protectorates in Singapore and British Borneo.

In the broader context of world and imperial histories, the introduction of the Chinese Protectorate in Singapore coincided with a shift in metropolitan attitudes in Britain and Europe toward poverty and other social issues, which in turn affected the nature of colonialism and imperialism. From the late nineteenth century, the world was heading towards a situation where state intervention to provide social welfare was not only accepted, but also welcomed or sought after. What caused this change, the critical precursor to even begin comprehending the need for state-provision of social welfare?

(The Brief) Origins of the Welfare State

The final decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a “basic transformation in the attitude towards poverty” in England and throughout Europe (Himmelfarb, 1991). Generally speaking, earlier perceptions saw poverty as an avoidable situation; that is, excepting those genuinely in need (because of old age or injury), the majority of the able-bodied poor were responsible for their own plight. Hence, there were deliberate efforts made to discourage indiscriminate poor relief. In England, this attitude led to the abolishment of outdoor relief (i.e. financial assistance) and the adherence to the “less eligibility” principle in the form of the dreaded workhouse, where conditions were intentionally made less ideal so as to discourage dependency and to encourage people to look for work.

Historical developments toward the end of the nineteenth century, particularly prolonged economic depressions and consequent social discontent, forced a gradual but steady change to such attitudes. For instance, the Long Depression of the late nineteenth century introduced the phenomenon of mass involuntary unemployment to governments of industrialised and industrialising states. This affected attitudes towards poverty and the poor in two ways. First, the involuntary nature of structural unemployment absolved the poor to some extent of prior presumptions of their lack of responsibility. Second, the presence of powerful critiques of the capitalist market economy, such as Socialism, Marxism and Communism, led to greater awareness of (and increasing dissatisfaction with) pre-existing societal divisions. Governments of the day began to realise that along with the real socio-economic woes of the unemployed, there was a clear political threat emerging, thereby easing the path for state intervention in social issues (Himmelfarb, 1991; Glennerster et al., 2004).

Accepting that something had to be done was moreover paralleled by a nascent belief that something could be done about poverty and other social ills. This was a fundamental change from earlier perceptions of poverty as an omnipresent part of human life (Geremek, 1994). In England, the social surveys of Charles Booth and Seebohn Rowntree at the turn of the twentieth century were ground-breaking as poverty was quantified for the first time in the form of the poverty line, or a minimal standard of living.⁹ Coupled with socio-economic ills and potential political threats, the presentation of poverty in stark statistics – hence making it theoretically possible to eradicate poverty – arguably encouraged governments to intervene more decisively to ensure the welfare of the societies they governed from the late nineteenth century onwards.

This is not to say that there were only benevolent motives behind the provision of social security by the state. Indeed, social security legislation, such as old age pensions and insurance for unemployment and sickness, were initially introduced by governments that are unlikely to be remembered as welfare-centric. For instance, Germany, via the authoritarian Otto von Bismarck, introduced social insurance during the 1880s ostensibly to outflank his political opponents. Nevertheless, his social legislation was the first in Europe and possibly the world at that point in time, legislation that was thereafter copied around continental Europe (Hennock, 1987). Inspired by Bismarck, the Liberal Party introduced similar social legislation in Britain during the first two decades of the twentieth century, marking a fundamental change in the party’s traditional ideological understanding of the relationship between the state, society and the market economy (Hennock, 1987; Fraser, 2003). In England, discourse over social policy and subsequent efforts to implement social reform also partly established the Labour Party in 1900 – which would oversee the creation of the post-war British welfare state, as well as influential non-governmental groups, such as the Fabian Society in 1884. The Fabians were one of the driving forces behind the Liberal Party’s social legislation, and would before long also become a significant influence on colonial social policy (Milburn, 1958).

Colonial Social Policy and the Second World War

Colonialism is not a historical experience usually thought of as benevolent. The manner in which the nature of colonialism evolved however was influenced, albeit indirectly, by the same historical factors and circumstances affecting metropolitan social policies. While there was no formal British colonial social policy until just before the Second World War, in Singapore at least, the establishment of the Chinese Protectorate in 1877 marked the beginning of a more paternalistic colonial administration. Intriguingly, this also coincided with the period of “high imperialism”, when the world witnessed an acceleration in European empire-building, particularly in Africa and Asia. But as the imperial powers would discover, direct territorial annexation, especially in competition with others, necessitated some assumption of responsibility, however unintended, for their colonial possessions and the peoples living within them. The Dutch, French and Americans coupled their territorial expansion in Southeast Asia with a civilising rhetoric. The Dutch attempted to reverse earlier neglect of the Javanese with the Ethical Policy in 1900, an aid programme designed to improve the Javanese standard of living. The French colonised Indochina in the name of “vocation civilisatrice” (civilising mission), while the Americans differentiated their brand of colonialism from the Spanish, with the promise of eventual self-government for the Philippines (Govaars, 2005).

The impact of crisis situations, such as war and economic depressions, on both metropolitan and colonial social policy cannot be overstated (Fraser, 2003; Thompson, 2000; Finlayson, 1994; Skocpol, 1992). The beginnings of a British colonial social policy can be traced to the First World War. The British had realised that they could not fight a massive war without the support of both metropole and colonial societies.¹⁰ Their colonial responsibilities also increased after the war, as the victors assumed responsibility for the colonies of the defeated, in the form of mandates and trusteeships (Lewis, 2011). Just as the Long Depression of the late nineteenth century affected European social policy, the Great Depression of the 1930s had a similar impact on British colonial social policy. The ill-effects of the depression led to social discontent and labour unrest in the British West Indies during the 1930s. In response, the Colonial Office introduced the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1940, committing the British government to provide financial aid specifically for the development and betterment of the colonies for a period of ten years (Morgan, 1980).¹¹

The totality of the Second World War irrevocably involved the Empire in the deliberations of the British government and the Colonial Office (Lee & Petter, 1982). The Act could arguably be perceived as war propaganda, promising financial aid and socio-economic development for loyalty, and deflecting enemy accusations of colonial maladministration. Regardless, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act remains a historical landmark in British colonial policy as it was the manifestation of a “forward policy” for the Empire (Lee & Petter, 1982, p. 29). Passed in 1940, such a commitment barely a year into the Second World War was a significant statement of intent from the British government – even if wartime conditions ensured the Act remained a gesture until after the war (Morgan, 1980, pp. 87–88). The fall of Singapore in February 1942 and the threat of Japanese aggression to other parts of the British Empire only aggravated feelings of vulnerability and increased criticism of earlier ambivalence and neglect of their “tropical East Ends”, i.e. the poorer colonies (Lewis, 2000, p. 94).

Metropolitan social policy did not remain stagnant either during the war years. Not only was British society united by indiscriminate German bombs and food rationing, it was also scandalised by the “re-appearance” of poverty in the shape of malnourished evacuees arriving from the cities (Timuss, 1950; Addison, 1975). Coupled with the need to mobilised public support, the impetus for social reform within British society was urgently felt. In December 1942, about ten months after the demoralising defeat inflicted by the Japanese in Singapore, Sir William Beveridge’s Social Insurance and Allied Services (also known as the Beveridge Report or Beveridge Plan), provided that impetus with a direction (Beveridge, 1942).¹² Beveridge’s vision of a comprehensive social security scheme to provide protection from the five “Giant Evils” of society (squalor, ignorance, want, idleness and disease), laid the philosophical foundations for the post-war British welfare state. Arriving as it did during the war, the Beveridge Plan also provided the promise of a better and just post-war society in return for sacrifices made during the war (Addison, 1975; Wincott, 2011, pp. 356–358). The public reaction to the Beveridge Report was nothing short of euphoric, particularly for a dense government report. There was also a high demand for the report outside of Britain and throughout the British Empire (Abel-Smith, 1994).

However, the Colonial Office was eager to dampen the enthusiastic response to the Beveridge Plan. In June 1944, the Colonial Office published a memorandum entitled Social Security in the Colonial Territories. Social security was broadly defined as “freedom from want” or “the provision of guaranteed maintenance on some minimum scale for every individual in a community” (Colonial Office, 1944). While crediting the Beveridge Plan for the “considerable and growing” interest within the British Empire in the “question of social security and social insurance”, the paper went on to advise against indiscriminate implementation without due consideration to the particular “social structures” of different colonies (p. 1). Any attempt to implement social security provisions in the colonies, the paper forewarned, must take into account the adequacy of the “economic and financial base” of the colony as well as the particular needs of the colony (p. 1).

A colonial policy directive on social welfare was also circulated (“Social Welfare”, n.d.). The directive was intended to guide the post-war implementation of social welfare programmes in the Malayan Union, Singapore, Hong Kong and British Borneo. It was however somewhat vague as it did not give a clear sense of what social welfare meant. Instead, it stated that the “Government should appoint a Senior Social Welfare Officer and any Welfare Staff should be under his direction”, and that the “efforts of these Officers... should be directed towards improving the general well being of the community in its widest sense” (“Social Welfare”, n.d.). A clearer instruction was to establish a “Social Welfare Advisory Committee for the purpose of stimulating and co-ordinating [social welfare] work....” (“Social Welfare”, n.d.). The directive for the Malayan Union and Singapore also identified the following government services of Medical, Agricultural, Veterinary, Labour, Co-operative and Education as government departments which would also be directly concerned with the social welfare of the people.

The emphasis of the policy directive lay less in carving out a definitive scope of functions and services that could be clustered under the heading of “social welfare”, and more in the hopeful extolling of cooperation and coordination between official government departments and public organisations to further a “general plan for social welfare, based on the ascertained needs of the community and so constructed as to give proper weight to the requirements of both urban and rural areas” (“Social Welfare”, n.d.). Nevertheless, the policy directive remains thus far the best indication of a commitment, if not the technical expertise and knowledge, on the part of the Colonial Office to implement social welfare in Singapore and the other Far Eastern territories after the Second World War.

The Establishment of State Welfare in Singapore

Post-war Singapore however was not a blank slate for a seemingly benevolent colonial social policy. The British returned in 1945 with a diminished reputation and as only one of several forces competing for the hearts and minds of the people. “The world has changed,” as one Communist leader observed of a victory procession in Malaya where the “poor people” like her, were leading the towkays of a former era (as cited in Bayly and Harper, 2007, p. 58). The British moreover could not return for another three weeks after the Japanese surrender, allowing organised forces already on the ground to enforce their authority in the ensuing power vacuum, especially the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The speed of the Japanese capitulation after the dropping of the atomic bombs, however, welcomed disrupted plans for the British reoccupation of Malaya and Singapore, plans that assumed the provision of relief in war conditions, not peace-time. Simply put, the British had planned for relief in kind, e.g. food and temporary shelter; they did not plan to provide cash assistance.

On 11 September 1945 – one day after an initial attempt at relief operations and about a week after the British returned to Singapore, a “relief demonstration” took place outside the Chinese Secretariat building. The relevant BMA file – entitled “Demonstration in front of the Chinese Secretariat for urgent adoption of relief measures” (September 11, 1945) – unfortunately does not say much as it contains only two documents: one with handwritten names in English and Chinese, and the other, a typewritten version of that list entitled “List of Community Leaders at meeting convened by Brigadier P.A.B. McKerron C.M.G. held at Chinese Secretariat Building on 11 September 1945.” There seems to be a discrepancy between the second document and the title of the BMA file. Was the meeting convened by the British, or was it forced upon them by the demonstration? Relief operations distributing rice, sugar and salt had only started the day before on 10 September. The quantity of relief however was severely inadequate, nor was the method of relief effective for reconstruction and economic recovery (“Shops Closed all Over the City” & “A Hungry Day”, September 11, 1945).

On 12 September, another meeting took place between the British and a group of some forty organisations that were involved in anti-Japanese resistance (“Letter from S/Ldr James to Colonel Purcell”, September 13, 1945). This time, the latter demonstrated their readiness to take the lead in relief provision by presenting detailed plans for the establishment of relief centres,¹³ the staff to work in those centres, a list of expected groups of people requiring immediate relief,¹⁴ and an estimated budget of $3,000,000 for relief purposes. The representatives had stressed that “there are people now who have been able to buy no food for a week, and they cannot wait many more days” (James, September 13, 1945). Compared to the earlier meeting where business interests were represented, this meeting was heavily influenced by the Communists. In addition to the recommendations for cash relief, the group also requested that the British endorse the eight principles drawn up by the Communist Party of Malaya and destroy the Japanese military currency.

On 17 September, Patrick McKerron, Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO) of Singapore Division, BMA Malaya, officially convened an emergency relief committee based at the Victoria Memorial Hall (“Minutes of First Meeting”, September 17, 1945). In view of the pressure exerted, it was perhaps no coincidence McKerron also declared that the BMA had lived up to its word in ensuring that relief operations started on the day the BMA said it would (p. 1). Relief was to be given to those who “have no means of sustenance”, starting from $2.50 per head of household (up to a maximum of $5.00 per family), and later increasing to $5.00 per head of household (up to a maximum of $20.00 per family) (“Emergency Relief Measures in Singapore”, n.d.). McKerron warned that the BMA did not intend to “inaugurate any form of unemployment relief or the dole” (“Minutes of First Meeting”, September 17, 1945). Relief in this particular instance was seen to address an emergency, i.e. the immediate and temporary needs of a hungry population and a peace-time economy recovering from the Japanese occupation. There was also a practical purpose in providing cash relief, as the newly-minted Malayan dollar needed to be circulated back into the economy (Kratoska, 1992). Despite McKerron’s pronouncement, The Straits Times observed rather adroitly that there was no difference between BMA emergency cash relief and the dole, and that the BMA had done what the Malayan Civil Service had “stubbornly refused to do” all this while (“The Dole”, October 4, 1945). But, “new times demand new methods”, the article noted and even went on to suggest that the BMA emergency relief could be the start of a “modern and enlightened policy for poor relief in Malaya” (“The Dole”, October 4, 1945).

It is interesting to note that McKerron himself – the executive head of the BMA government, and later Colonial Secretary of the succeeding civil administration – chaired the first and most of the subsequent meetings of the emergency relief committee. The significance attached to the committee could have been due to the pressure exerted by the Communist-influenced groups. But there could also be a simple administrative explanation. There was arguably not a single BMA or pre-war government department that had the expertise to attempt relief operations for a multi-racial population – immediately precluding the Chinese Affairs Department, a population that moreover was not displaced – and hence did not need the Refugee and Displaced Persons Department. The Labour Department could help match the able-bodied to employment, but its effectiveness was also limited by the availability of jobs, the quantity of new Malayan currency to replace the discontinued Japanese military script, and the availability of goods and services to spend the money on. Emergency relief was moreover not a simple transaction of exchanging cash for applications. There had to be a staff to process the applications, interviewers to assess the applicants, investigators to authenticate the applicant’s need for relief, and a fit and proper structure to handle and distribute the cash.¹⁵ In the end, staff and expertise came from both state and society. The Salvation Army provided the guidance and operational experience in relief provision, while pre-war colonial government staff – including a certain Goh Keng Swee – provided the administrative expertise.

Most, if not, all of the emergency relief centre staff joined the new Singapore Department of Social Welfare (hereafter Department) when it was established in June 1946. In its early years, the Department focused on services that dealt more with the impact of the war and occupation, such as emergency cash relief, shelter for refugees and displaced persons, and a mass feeding programme (Department, 1947). But the Department had longer-term plans to define and implement social welfare in Singapore. Within a couple of months of its inception, the department’s research section planned for a survey of post-war social conditions in Singapore. The survey was completed in 1947 and generated useful data for future social policies and programmes (Department, 1948a). In the same year, Department staff also participated in an international conference on social welfare hosted in Singapore, during which it was reaffirmed that social welfare would become a permanent part of the Singapore government (Department, 1948).

The existence of the social welfare department however did not necessarily usher in a welfare state. The scope of the Department tended more towards the direct services, i.e. services that target particular needs, such as relief for the destitute, institutional care for the elderly and children, probation care for juveniles, and community development (Department, 1949). While the services provided by the Department was an integral part of post-war Singapore’s social policy, impetus for social security would have to come from higher levels in government. Simply put, the decision to redistribute financial and other resources to introduce welfare state-style legislation and programmes was (and still is) political.

Most, if not, all of the emergency relief centre staff joined the new Singapore Department of Social Welfare (hereafter Department) when it was established in June 1946. In its early years, the Department focused on services that dealt more with the impact of the war and occupation, such as emergency cash relief, shelter for refugees and displaced persons, and a mass feeding programme (Department, 1947). But the Department had longer-term plans to define and implement social welfare in Singapore. Within a couple of months of its inception, the department’s research section planned for a survey of post-war social conditions in Singapore. The survey was completed in 1947 and generated useful data for future social policies and programmes (Department, 1948a). In the same year, Department staff also participated in an international conference on social welfare hosted in Singapore, during which it was reaffirmed that social welfare would become a permanent part of the Singapore government (Department, 1948).

The existence of the social welfare department however did not necessarily usher in a welfare state. The scope of the Department tended more towards the direct services, i.e. services that target particular needs, such as relief for the destitute, institutional care for the elderly and children, probation care for juveniles, and community development (Department, 1949). While the services provided by the Department was an integral part of post-war Singapore’s social policy, impetus for social security would have to come from higher levels in government. Simply put, the decision to redistribute financial and other resources to introduce welfare state-style legislation and programmes was (and still is) political.

Conceiving Social Security in Singapore

The initial public demand for a social security scheme came from Lim Yew Hock. From 1948 to 1955, Lim was an Unofficial Member of the Singapore Legislative Council, ostensibly to represent the trade unions. In 1948, he proposed that all commercial firms should be compelled by law to provide either a provident fund or a social insurance scheme for their employees, observing that “there must be some social security for workers who are the backbone of any democracy” (“Social Security: Council Demand”, August 18, 1948). The following year in 1949, Lim went further, pushing a resolution through the Legislative Council to commit the government to investigate and to make recommendations for social security legislation (Singapore Legislative Council [SLC], 1949).¹⁶ The ensuing debate was lively and distinctly showed the dividing lines within the council. The representatives from the various Chambers of Commerce proposed an amendment to Lim’s resolution, essentially to remove any commitment on the part of government to legislate for social security (SLC, 1949).¹⁷ The proposed amendment was defeated and Lim’s motion was carried with the tacit support of McKerron, by then Colonial Secretary of the Singapore government (SLC, 1949). McKerron took the opportunity to inform the council that the social welfare department had been investigating the “question of developing social security services” since 1948 and invited Lim to join the Department committee already formed (SLC, 1949).¹⁸

However, nothing materialised after the council meeting of March 15, 1949. Lim Yew Hock did not seem to make further public statements on social security, nor was there any news, publicly at least, about the committee looking into social security. It is possible that social security matters were overtaken by more pressing concerns, such as political developments within Singapore, and the Malayan Emergency and the Cold War. In 1951, at the height of hustings for the second Legislative Council elections (and in response to Lim’s campaigning), a disgruntled reader of The Straits Times asked what had happened to the resolution passed almost two years ago (“The Egg that Takes too Long to Hatch”, February 14, 1951). Lim was at that time busy running for a Legislative Council seat as the President of the Labour Party of Singapore, on a manifesto that included social security for workers (“Singapore will go to The Polls Tomorrow”, April 9, 1951).

As can be discerned from the memorandum on social security (Colonial Office, 1944), there was undeniable British caution against the indiscriminate implementation of metropolitan-style social policy. There were, however, real obstacles to a welfare state. A point often lost in the euphoric reception of the Beveridge Report was that Beveridge’s plan was not all that revolutionary. Instead, Beveridge’s focus was on efficiency via the unification of the social security programmes and social services already in place, “a stage...reached after nearly 100 years of steady advance in the field of social progress” (Department, 1949).¹⁹ Singapore did not have the foundations – painstakingly laid over a long period of time – Britain had. Thus, there was precious little expertise and knowledge to operate social security programmes and social services beyond the local level. For instance, the colonial government did consider a healthcare system for Singapore similar to the British National Health Service. But the proposal was a non-starter because there were not enough doctors and hospital beds (ILO, 1957). There was also apprehension, voiced by the Commissioner of Labour in 1948, as to whether workers in Singapore would accept the contributory principle of the British social insurance programmes, when they were already receiving similar benefits from their employers (“Many Colony Labourers Better Off Than Britons”, October 14, 1948).

However, confronted with a strident and violent anti-colonialism, the colonial authorities as well as local political parties could ill-afford to ignore an organised working class. At the behest of Lim Yew Hock, the government approved treatment allowances for workers (and their families) recovering from tuberculosis in 1949 (Department, 1951). The former BMA emergency relief – the first instance of direct state assistance – was continued by the Department of Social Welfare and officially repackaged as the Public Assistance scheme in 1951 (Department, 1952). In the same year, the Progressive Party tabled the Central Provident Fund (CPF) bill for approval, starting a long four-year process to the Fund’s eventual introduction in 1955 (Lim, 2012).

Almost at the same time, the colonial government established a commission to study “desirability and practicability” of retirement benefits (Retirement Benefits Commission [RBC], 1952).²⁰ The commission was plagued by difficulties from the start. There was little to no public information about its work and purpose (“Trade unions in the dark”, May 30, 1951). There was moreover no trade union representation on the Commission (“Union leaders answer critic, July 20, 1951). Thus, despite repeated solicitations, the majority of the trade unions did not respond positively to the Commission’s request for their views, forcing one postponement of scheduled hearings (“Commission – nothing to hear”, June 19, 1951). The Commission considered two options, a provident fund and a pension scheme, and the majority found in favour of the latter option, noting that the middle-aged worker fully benefits from a pension scheme and that the provident fund may not be adequate for retirement needs in the long-term (RBC, 1952, p. 15). There was one dissenting voice who preferred not to make any recommendations as he disagreed with the base assumption for a pension scheme, that addressing the care and needs of the old-aged in Singapore via “ties of kinship and friendship” were haphazard, and the community-base approach of a pension scheme was preferable (p. 16). The Commission’s report, released in 1952, did not stop the Progressive Party’s push for the CPF scheme. Its efforts were further emboldened by trade union support for a provident fund scheme (“Unions Prefer Provident Fund”, March 17, 1952), as well as public disdain for the recommended pension amount (“$30 a Month Pension Ridiculous”, February 29, 1952).²¹ The CPF bill was finally passed in November 1953 (“Now the Workers Need Not Fear the Day”, November 25, 1953). Administrative plans were set into motion throughout 1954,²² and the CPF scheme began operations in July 1955.²³

1955 was also the year Singapore received partial self-governance under the conditions stipulated by the Rendel Constitution. The new government, a coalition between David Marshall’s Labour Front Party and the UMNO-MCA Alliance, also included Lim Yew Hock, who became Minister for Labour and Welfare. After taking office, the government commissioned two interrelated studies that nudged Singapore closer to becoming a welfare state. The first was a study on the feasibility of the state ensuring minimum standards of livelihood, a term that included a minimum wage, unemployment insurance and other social security measures (Committee on Minimum Standards of Livelihood [CMSL], 1957).²⁴ The second was an extensive survey of existing social welfare and social security measures in Singapore by an ILO expert (“Minimum Wage on The Way: ILO Man to Study Ways”, October 4, 1955). Both studies were to make proposals to improve or to establish social protection of the people of Singapore.

The Minimum Standards of Livelihood committee was chaired by Sir Sydney Caine, a seasoned colonial official and the government’s Economic Advisor. The committee also included the late S. Rajaratnam and Lim Chong Yah, then a young economist assisting Caine. The committee started work in November 1955 and submitted its findings in September 1956 (CMSL, 1957). A broad range of views was solicited from both employers and employees, leading the committee to conclude that there were inherent difficulties as well as detrimental effects in ensuring a minimum wage at that point in time (pp. 32–33). The committee, however, recommended a comprehensive social security scheme, beginning with coverage for old age, death and sickness, with a view to cover unemployment later. The scheme was to be financed from employer and employee contributions (pp 40–41). To administer the scheme, the committee suggested the reorganisation of the Department of Social Welfare into three divisions for Insurance (which would be based on the existing administrative structure of the CPF scheme), Public Assistance, and Welfare (pp 57–59). The committee also agreed with the Retirement Benefits Commission, that the CPF scheme as it was, “cannot answer fully the need for provision of the aged” and recommended the CPF scheme should cease upon introduction of the social security scheme (pp. 43–44).

The second study took place almost simultaneously and was also intimately connected to the government’s concerns with the labour unrest and the consequences of rising unemployment. From the time they took office, the government, in particular Lim Yew Hock as the Minister for Labour and Welfare, stated publicly several times that it had approached the ILO to provide expert guidance (“Jobs Problem: Govt. Calls In an Expert”, June 6, 1955; “Govt. Asks ILO Aid on Labour Troubles”, August 31, 1955). The ILO expert – G. J. Brocklehurst, an official from the New Zealand Social Security Department – finally arrived in October 1955, beginning a year-long study of Singapore’s existing social security measures, which was published in 1957 (ILO, 1957a).²⁵ Brocklehurst’s final recommendations were similar to those from the Caine Report: a contributory social insurance scheme, covering first “temporary incapacity for work” (due to sickness or maternity), and after one year, old age, invalidity and death of breadwinner (pp. 70–72). Further study was recommended before deciding on unemployment benefits. Brocklehurst also recommended that all CPF contributions should cease after a year of the social insurance scheme, and to administer the scheme, he recommended the expansion of the Social Welfare Department into a new Social Security Department, placed under the purview of the Ministry of Labour and Welfare (pp. 79–80).

In January 1958, Lim Yew Hock (who had replaced David Marshall as Chief Minister in June 1956) appointed a committee of officials to examine both reports and to recommend the following courses of action to take by the government.²⁶ The committee agreed with the majority of the recommendations of both reports: namely the establishment of a contributory social insurance scheme, starting with benefits for old age, sickness, maternity, and death of breadwinner, while unemployment insurance would begin only after a successful implementation of the scheme (Singapore Committee of Officials, 1958). Contributions to the CPF would cease upon commencement of the social insurance scheme, with options for CPF members to transfer their balances to the new insurance fund or to stay with the CPF scheme (pp. 33–34). A new Department of Social Security would be created by incorporating the administrative structure of the Central Provident Fund and the Public Assistance Section of the Department of Social Welfare (pp. 28–32).

Further assistance from the ILO was also requested to draft legislation for the new social security scheme as well as administrative guidance for the establishment of the social security department. It duly arrived in December 1958, in the person of F. B. Matthews, an official from the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance of the United Kingdom (“Welfare State: Expert Aid From Britain”, January 8, 1959). Over the course of the following six months, Matthews submitted four drafts of a social security bill to the government (ILO, 1959, pp. 3–4). The final draft, along with technical guidance for the establishment of a social security department, was submitted in June 1959 to the new government formed by the People’s Action Party (PAP).

The Welfare State Stillborn

Singapore today does not have the comprehensive social insurance envisioned and prepared for in 1959. So the remaining questions are what happened and why? To be sure, the incoming PAP government did not immediately ditch ten years worth of work after taking office, nor were they ignorant of the connection between economic development, industrial stability and social security for workers. Dr Toh Chin Chye welcomed the Brocklehurst Report in 1957 in his capacity as PAP Chairman and noted that its recommendations were an improvement on the CPF scheme (“Unionists and Politicians Welcome the Brocklehurst Report”, December 9, 1957). As Acting Director of Social Welfare, Dr Goh Keng Swee had even argued against the Caine and Brocklehurst reports’ recommendation to delay implementation of unemployment insurance (Singapore Committee of Officials, 1958, pp. 56–57). Between December 1960 and January 1961, Goh also held talks, as Minister for Finance, with the Singapore Trades Union Congress (TUC) to establish industrial peace. During those meetings, the TUC representatives agreed in principle with the government’s intention to implement unemployment insurance (“TUC and Govt. Agree on Industrial Peace”, April 12, 1961).

Unfortunately, further progress was improbable as the TUC opposed employee contributions to finance the unemployment insurance scheme. Social security issues, moreover, became less important in the turbulent political situation after 1959. 1961 was a decidedly bad year for the PAP as it endured crisis after crisis, e.g. the by-elections for Hong Lim and Anson, and the Barisan Sosialis defections that almost brought down the PAP government. The issue of unemployment insurance was apparently forgotten until David Marshall, then representing the Workers’ Party in the Legislative Assembly, asked for the government’s official position on the Caine and Brocklehurst reports (“Singapore Govt. to Call for Talks on Jobless Insurance”, November 30, 1961). The follow-up debate over Marshall’s question was heated. Goh Keng Swee and Lee Kuan Yew alleged that the TUC’s opposition to employee contributions undermined any hope of introducing unemployment insurance, let alone a more comprehensive social security scheme (Singapore Legislative Assembly, March 15, 1962). S. T. Bani, a Barisan Sosialis assemblyman and a former TUC representative, disagreed with the PAP’s interpretation of events and provided the other side of the story: that unemployment insurance contributions would be an additional burden to workers already contributing to the CPF, and that the dissolution of the TUC (the same time the Barisan Sosialis split from the PAP) meant the issue could not be followed up (cols. 138–143). Lee was characteristically blunt, suggesting that in the view of the Barisan Sosialis, compared to maintaining an agitated working class base and the implications of merger with Malaysia, social security was a “frivolous and less important” issue. (cols. 146–147). The irony is palpable even now, as the TUC leaders, who allegedly stonewalled the unemployment insurance scheme were at that time PAP members,27 revealing the deep fault-lines within the party leading up to the split in July 1961.

The PAP government did consider unemployment insurance again after 1965 amidst fears of rising unemployment, exacerbated by the British military withdrawal announced in 1967. Yet, another ILO expert was invited to Singapore in 1968 to provide expert advice (“ILO man nears end of social security scheme survey”, January 5, 1968). This time around, the government was more decisive in abandoning plans for an unemployment insurance scheme to be financed by payroll taxes. Goh Keng Swee, in his second stint as Finance Minister, observed that the scheme would be an additional burden to employers and employees already contributing increased rates to the CPF and that the “best way to tackle unemployment was by economic expansion” (“S’pore scraps jobless insurance scheme”, March 24, 1970). Coming from someone who had seemingly provided continuous support for unemployment insurance, Goh’s statement was the final nail in the coffin of any lingering intent to introduce welfare state-style programmes in Singapore.²⁸

Postscript

Since Singapore’s brief flirtation with the welfare state, the CPF scheme has evolved beyond its initial purpose as a compulsory retirement savings fund, expanding to include coverage for housing, healthcare and education needs – covering most of the recognised social needs (“Overview”, 2012). Even its structure as a provident fund has been altered to include elements of social insurance for health (e.g. Medishield) and old age (e.g. CPF LIFE). Social contingencies that could not be covered under by the CPF were initially addressed by the Public Assistance scheme, the successor to the BMA emergency relief (“Permanently Unable to Work”, 2012). This scheme is still in operation. But its administering agency, the Department of Social Welfare, has ceased to exist as a distinct government agency since 1985, as its functions were incorporated into the then Ministry of Community Development. The proposed Social Security Department never materialised as there was no social insurance scheme to administer.

Interestingly, however, it seems that in recent times the proverbial coffin nail is being gradually pried out. Persistent concerns with structural unemployment, an ageing population, as well as continued attempts at nation-building have resurrected talk of introducing some form of social insurance in Singapore (Manu, Ho, Low, Tan, Sudhir & Yeoh, 2012, pp. 27–28). Furthermore, in 2012, the original functions and services of the old Department of Social Welfare are once again consolidated under a single government agency, i.e. the Ministry of Social and Family Development, suggesting that the Singapore government wishes to take an unencumbered position on social issues (Hetty, 1 August 2012). While circumstances were different and the directions taken have contrasted, twenty-first century concerns do share common ground with the anxieties of European governments at the turn of the twentieth century, the Colonial Office during the 1930s, and successive post-war Singapore governments; that is, the perennial attempt to balance economic growth, social equality and political stability.