“Prosperity Through Quality and Reliability”: SISIR and the Making of a Quality Conscious Nation

By Sharad Pandian

Image reproduced from "Buying to Specifications" (Singapore: Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research, 1986), 14. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RCLOS 381.33).

Introduction: A Reputation for Trade

A reputation for making quality products is essential, especially if a company wants to break into new markets. In their 2019 book Good Economics for Hard Times, Nobel prize-winning economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo present a case study that illustrates this. Aid to Artisans (ATA), an American non-governmental organisation, sought to help artisans in developing countries reach international markets. In 2009, ATA received funding to implement a programme in Egypt and decided to promote handmade rugs from the town of Fowa. Even with ATA’s contacts and funding, it took 1.5 years to secure the first significant export order, and more than five years to reach orders totalling $150,000. Without the aid of ATA, even this would probably have not been possible.

Banerjee and Duflo suggest that the difficulty stems from the fact that from the perspective of a foreign buyer, a new supplier is always a gamble. The buyer – in this case, large retailers or online stores – has customers who expect both products of quality and regularity in supply. If there are delays or shoddy products, the reputational loss for the established foreign retailer would be too significant, even if the new supplier offered cheaper goods.¹

A crucial problem for new entrants therefore concerns trustworthiness and credibility – of products, the manufacturer’s capability and commitment, and even their country’s situation. After all, it is not only the reputation of individual manufacturers that matters, but also that of the larger social entities they are associated with. National reputations can colour how a product is received – for example, a new Japanese entrant like Mitsubishi benefited from the reputation of older Japanese car brands for being well-made. The flip side is that a car made in a country without an existing reputation for producing quality cars would unfortunately seem like a riskier wildcard.²

Given that Singapore’s economic prosperity was achieved through an export-oriented strategy, one question then is how this problem of credibility was solved. This essay argues that an important part of this answer concerns standardisation and the promulgation of quality-consciousness by the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research (SISIR). This cultivation of quality-consciousness should be seen as the launch of a virtuous cycle, where greater adherence to quality by manufacturers created a greater demand for higher quality products by consumers, which in turn incentivised manufacturers to produce higher quality products.

Despite the importance of SISIR, it is striking that there has not been a single research paper, let alone a monograph, dedicated to understanding its history or workings. For now, it has simply been mentioned in passing in books on Singapore’s scientific and industrial history.³ This disregard can be explained in part by the history of local technical institutions being stereotyped as either boring or inaccessible.

In addition, SISIR itself was administratively sprawling – the 1973 bill that established SISIR as a statutory board specified 22 different duties that included undertaking industrial research, promoting standardisation, calibrating instruments, incubating new products and providing technical information services. This essay restricts itself to only the standardisation-related functions of the institute. Instead of dwelling in detail on technical specifications, I provide a broad-stroke history of the institute. Since SISIR’s institutional records held at the National Archives of Singapore (NAS) remain classified, this essay relies on material available at the National Library, NewspaperSG, and publicly-accessible material at NAS like oral histories and news clips.

Using these sources, I aim to make four arguments. First, I track the convergence of state and manufacturers’ interests in promoting exports, leading to the formation of a programme for standardisation. A key moment for the origin of SISIR was a 1968 conference (the National Conference on Scientific and Technical Co-operation Between Industries and Governmental Bodies) organised by the Singapore Science Council between manufacturers and government representatives, where much of the future directions of SISIR were hammered out. The National Library’s collection includes not just the speeches and papers presented at this conference, but also records of discussions among participants. This lets us trace the process of decision-making, helping us appreciate on a rare fine-grained scale how different interests were articulated and consensus reached.

Second, I take up the question of how SISIR worked. Here I offer a schematic account of the quality assurance schemes launched, which incentivised standardisation without mandating them. Through a case study of a controversial photodegradable bag, I showcase both SISIR’s authority in mediating scientific disputes and the limitations of its interventions.

Important as manufacturers are to this story, they were not the only relevant community. Third, I broaden the story by surveying various publicity campaigns SISIR deployed to achieve credibility. Targeting both the general public and consumers, these campaigns involved flying flags, issuing stamps, creating cartoons, and shooting educational videos.

Finally, I explore a variety of suggestive indicators of SISIR’s success – ranging from recognition from foreign standard bodies to its mention in local advertisements. In short, this essay does not aim for comprehensiveness; it aims instead to provide a broad overview of the institution and makes the case that it represents an important part of Singapore’s economic and cultural history.

Origins – The 1968 National Conference on Scientific and Technical Co-operation Between Industries and Governmental Bodies

Images reproduced from "Summary of Proceedings: Singapore Conference Hall 23rd to 26th October, 1968: National Conference on Scientific and Technical Co-operation between Industries and Governmental Bodies" (Singapore: Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research, 1986), 13-14. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RCLOS 338.095951 NAT).

The early days of the Republic were a time of economic anxiety, and the government decided the only way forward involved the rapid appropriation and deployment of Science and Technology. In February 1966, an Ad Hoc Scientific Committee was established to advise the government on scientific matters, but its non-official status meant it lacked funding and access to confidential data. To remedy these shortcomings, Deputy Prime Minister Dr Toh Chin Chye introduced the Science Council of Singapore Bill in 1967 to grant this advisory body official status. Among its envisioned functions were to investigate technical problems such as the effective deployment of utilities and the prevention of pollution, to establish relationships with other scientific bodies, and “to study how industrial development [could] be promoted by the effective training and utilisation of scientific and technological manpower”.⁴ It would be headed by Dr Lee Kum Tatt, then a biochemist at the Ministry of Health.⁵

The newly official Science Council of Singapore understood its task not as promoting science for its own sake, but specifically to develop science as an “instrument for promoting rapid industrial and economic development in Singapore”.⁶ It understood its role as helping maximise human resources, including scientists and technologists. Finding an alarming lack of co-ordination of national scientific efforts and therefore the under-utilisation of existing manpower, the council attributed this failure to a lack of communication “among the various bodies concerned with science and technology in the Government, Statutory Bodies, private sector and the scientific community as a whole.”⁷ To remedy this, it sponsored the National Conference on Scientific and Technical Co-operation between Industries and Governmental Bodies in October 1968.⁸

The issue of standardisation was a key theme at the 1968 conference. In his opening address, Whang Tar Liang, chairman of the Singapore Manufacturers’ Association (SMA), argued that since the country’s industries were small compared to their counterparts in the developed world, the private sector could not tackle these problems alone – collaboration with the government would be necessary. One such area was standardisation: Whang insisted that “For any product to sell in the market, especially the international market, it must conform to certain standards that the buyer can base on for the evaluation of the product.”⁹ Singapore’s industries therefore needed a standards institute.

In a working paper, Ernest Wong from the Economic Development Board’s (EDB) Technical Consultant Services Division also advocated for standardisation. While he thought that the costs involved with the development of a comprehensive set of standards meant standardisation was typically only appropriate for countries with a high level of development, it would be apt for Singapore’s unusual position, since its industries had “to face the full brunt of international competition right from the outset”.¹⁰ In this case, the development and adherence to standards could help “project a quality image in world markets.”¹¹

Finally, G. A. Baker and Woo Tihsien, representing the SMA, also explicitly advocated for the establishment of a National Standards Authority in their working paper. As industrialisation proceeds, they argued, “[t]rade, commerce and industry cease to be strictly local and national in character, and begin to take on export orientations”.¹² As a result, purchasers of products may be located miles away and therefore be forced to pay for goods without being able to see or test them. This would naturally make them cautious. Unable to rely on their own individual ability to ascertain quality, they would naturally rely on some dependable authority, such as a widely accepted standard.¹³ Standards can be issued either by private companies or a national or international standards body. However, a private company or set of companies would naturally “orientate its Standards as to its – or their – own best interest, which may not be in the long-term interests of others or of the country”.¹⁴ Thus, they urged the formation of “an autonomous, active, authoritative National Standards Body”.¹⁵

Baker and Woo envisioned that this national standards body would concern itself with collecting and making available the latest standards from other countries; helping companies develop their own internal standards, policies and departments; developing National Standards or recommending the adoption of suitable alternatives; and finally, being part of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).¹⁶

In addition, they wanted a distinct institution that would test products for compliance with standards and certify them accordingly.¹⁷ With such a clear consensus from both industry and government representatives, standardisation was bound to take off. The only question was how best to implement this programme.

From IRU to SISIR

By 1968, modest efforts at standardisation were already underway at EDB’s Industrial Research Unit (IRU). T.R. Pollard, the Colombo Plan expert from New Zealand who had recommended establishing the IRU in 1960, had at the same time recommended establishing a standards bureau.¹⁸ Consequently, in 1963, EDB’s Technical Consultant Services Division announced the opening of the IRU and a separate Standards Unit. The relationship between the IRU and a standardisation programme continued to be openly discussed – for example, at the IRU Advisory Council’s second meeting on 18 October 1963, the setting up of a Standards Bureau for Malaysia was reviewed, and the council seemed to believe the IRU would be the natural choice as a testing authority for standards in Singapore.¹⁹

In the IRU’s 1964 Annual Report, interim director D.I. Woods envisioned the unit serving as a technological backstop for industry through the promotion of national standards. However, he insisted that “the IRU should not become the standards authority”,²⁰ since he thought this would jeopardise its independence, instead urging that it take an active part in technical standards committees and in standards promotion work.²¹

Despite such separate visions, the EDB’s Standards Unit was incorporated into the IRU in 1965. The IRU’s status and function therefore became disorganised – on the one hand, it continued serving as a testing body for industry; on the other, it subsequently produced a code of practice for the use of timber and became a member of ISO, acting as a standards authority would.²²

Apart from the ambiguity in function, there were also serious concerns about its capabilities: at the 1968 conference, Dr Tan Eng Liang of Zuellig (Gold Coin Mills) Ltd. noted that IRU’s staff were young and inexperienced, and suggested experienced men from industry serve as consultants.²³ Even Dr Lee of the Science Council admitted that the IRU “had not been able to do much for industry” due to its limited budget.²⁴ Therefore when director of the IRU P.C. Leong brought up the IRU’s ongoing work in standardisation, Baker gently responded that while the SMA recognised the IRU’s good work, it still wanted a different authoritative national standards authority.²⁵

The vision of the SMA – and the earlier IRU leadership – prevailed. As a result of the 1968 conference, two new bodies were created from the IRU a year later: a Standards Council and SISIR. The former was established to approve standards suitable for Singapore through convening ad hoc technical committees. The council comprised representatives of the government, the SMA, professional organisations, and the trade and commerce sector.²⁶ SISIR was created as an autonomous agency of the EDB to test and certify standards (among other duties).²⁷ Right from the get-go, SISIR and the Standards Council were meant to work together: SISIR provided secretariat support for the council; Dr Lee was chairman of the Standards Council, while also serving as both chairman of the board and chief executive of SISIR.

The solution to the problem of the trust involved identifying high standards and ensuring that manufacturers abided by them. Even at the 1968 conference, there was agreement that national standards should be aligned with international ones – Baker and Woo’s working paper noted that national standards were often formed from recommendations put forward by international organisations like the ISO, leading to a trend of close accord between national and international standards. This prevented “highly individualistic national specifications”, which could pose inadvertent barriers to trade.²⁸

This endorsement of using international standards seems to have been so acceptable to the conference audience that in the discussion after the working paper’s presentation, J.C.M. Shaw of Premier Milk (S) Ltd., went so far as to ask why distinct “Singapore Standards” were even needed, instead of simply adopting standards from elsewhere. Baker’s response was that while “wherever possible, international standards should be adopted”, there remained requirements unique to the region – for example, packaging for “chilli blachen” [sic] – for which international standards might not exist.²⁹ A different conference discussion among manufacturers of electrical and electronic goods reached a similar understanding, stating that “as products of the industry are export oriented…It is felt that for long-term survival, the industry has to conform to accepted international standards.”³⁰

As a result, the standards approved as Singapore Standards by the Standards Council were largely drawn up from existing ones – in fact, every single Singapore Standard openly lists at its beginning the various international and foreign standards that were used in its preparation. But coming up with standards was just the beginning – it was afterwards that SISIR went to work.

How SISIR Worked

Quality Assurance Schemes

One question that was taken up at the conference concerned the law – specifically, what kind of legal framework was apt for Singapore’s standardisation programme. Two different lines of thinking emerged: on one hand, there was a reluctance to mandate standards – for example, Ernest Wong, head of the Technical Consultant Services Division of the EDB, warned that attempting to force standards “might be dangerous”, given the fledgling state of industry in the Republic. This sentiment was echoed by Dr Tan Eng Liang of Zuellig (Gold Coin Mills) Ltd., who insisted that “it was untimely” for legislation since neither domestic industry nor the suppliers of raw materials abroad would be able to comply with standards right away.³¹

On the other hand, there was also a recognition that they would have to weed out those who falsely claimed to comply with standards. For instance, S.L. Low of the Institution of Engineers cautioned that merely setting up the National Standards Authority would be insufficient, since anyone could simply claim to be following standards. Instead, manufacturers should be legally obligated to send in their products for testing before they could be labelled as abiding by Singapore Standards. Baker again agreed that a separate institution should be set up alongside the Standards Authority to certify products, entitling those products to bear an identification mark to that effect.³² The eventual testing agency was SISIR.

Given these needs and restrictions, SISIR introduced and incentivised a range of voluntary certification schemes. Since SISIR was still a part of the EDB, the 1961 Economic Development Board Ordinance was amended in June 1969 to grant the board “the power to establish, and promote the use of, industrial standards in Singapore and to operate a Standard Certification Marks scheme”, with a certification scheme initiated “to assure the purchasers of Singapore-made goods of the quality of their purchases”.³³

The 1973 Standards and Industrial Research Bill, which transformed SISIR into a statutory board, retained the institution’s power to conduct certification schemes and suitable inspections. It also made it an offence for anyone to use SISIR’s certification mark without authorisation from SISIR – in fact, it was an offence to make “any statement or representation, whether in writing or not, or use any mark which conveys or is likely to convey the impression that an article or a process conforms to a Singapore Standard or any other standard when in fact it does not”.³⁴

The first scheme, the Quality Certification Scheme, was rolled out in August 1969. To kickstart the scheme, the institute invited 20 manufacturers known to be adhering to international standards to participate. By 1986, 130 manufacturers were involved, with 960 distinct products being certified. A powerful incentive the government had put in place was for all government departments and statutory boards to give preference to goods certified by SISIR while making purchases.³⁵

SISIR Quality Certificate. Image reproduced from "Industrial News and Research" (Singapore: Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research, September 1971), 6. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RSING 607.25957).

Important as SISIR was in shaping the domestic market, its internationally oriented work was perhaps even more significant. The 1973 SISIR Bill also took up the question of export quality, authorising the minister-in-charge to establish schemes for quality control for export commodities, when it was necessary for the promotion of Singapore’s export trade. Commodities that fell under such schemes would be known as “notified commodities”, and each exporter had to inform SISIR of the particulars of each consignment so that it could be checked.³⁶

However, which standards were relevant to export commodities? Other countries had their own standards that exporters had to satisfy – standards that might not be identical to the relevant Singapore Standard. Therefore, under the SISIR Bill, it would be “the standard stipulated in the export contract”³⁷ that would be enforced, and only in the case that no such standard specified that the Singapore Standard would be applied instead. Successfully meeting the relevant standard would earn a certificate from SISIR for that particular consignment.³⁸

The government’s recognition that export contracts had standards stipulated is noteworthy. SISIR, of course, was not the only national certification agency in the world – each country typically had its own certification agency with rules specific to its territory. Products that sought to enter these territories therefore had to demonstrate that they had met the requirements of their target market. To avoid sending representatives of their own national certification agency abroad to each exporting country, the agency could enter into agreements with other countries’ certification agencies to mutually test the goods intended for export. For this system to work, standardising agencies had to be able to trust each other as competent and reliable.

On 1 January 1973, SISIR received a request from the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) to certify Canada-bound consumer electronics.³⁹ As a result, SISIR launched an Export Inspection Service in July 1974.⁴⁰ By 1987, SISIR reported that 22 overseas authorities had either appointed SISIR as their Singapore inspection agent or recognised its tests reports, an indication of widespread recognition of SISIR’s work.

Image reproduced from Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research, Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research Annual Report 1986-87 (Singapore: The Institute), 14. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RCLOS 354.5957093 SISIRA)

SISIR as Mediator

As the testing agency for standards, SISIR can be thought of as a mediator. It inserted itself between manufacturers and consumers (or between manufacturers and foreign standards bodies), using its own credibility as an independent institution to secure the credibility of the tested product.

SISIR mediated the relationship between manufacturer and consumer Image reproduced from "Buying to Specifications" (Singapore: Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research, 1986), 25. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RCLOS 381.33)

To test the credibility of a product, SISIR had to carry out a range of scientific tests for the sake of standardisation, and hence the same technical apparatus could be used for testing standards and for industrial research.

The necessary tests varied greatly because of the nature and expectations of different products. For example, one simple test was for holes in condoms, which required suspending a number of condoms from each batch and ensuring there was no leakage. Larger objects like curtain walls required far more elaborate and sophisticated machinery to test for quality.

Goods tested by SISIR ranged from condoms (left) to curtain walls (right). Images reproduced from Singapore Standards Council, Singapore Standards Council Annual Report 1978 (Singapore: The Institute, 1978), 20. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RCLOS 602.12 SCSSCA)

While SISIR’s work in mediation mostly involved testing for specifications, it was also occasionally called to mediate scientific disagreements. The case of Kenwa’s plastic bags illustrate the workings of SISIR and the specific kinds of interventions it had the authority to stage.

In the late 1980s, environmentalism surged across the world, and Singapore was no exception. Seeking to capitalise on this new trend, Singapore firm Kenwa Plastic Industries started advertising a photodegradable plastic bag.⁴¹ The Straits Times featured the bag in its “Ailing Earth: The Singapore Perspective” series on 1 January 1990, reporting that Kenwa’s bag would disintegrate after 200 hours exposure to sunlight.⁴² Seeking to position itself as progressive and environmentally conscious, The Body Shop ordered these bags and highlighted them in its publicity material.⁴³

Kenwa Plastic’s allegedly photodegradable bag. Image reproduced from "Page 21 Advertisements Column 1," Straits Times, 12 March 1990, 21. (From NewspaperSG)

However, the bag’s claim to sustainability was soon put to the test. For their Earth Day celebration, a class from the Singapore American School at Ulu Pandan decided to showcase the bag’s breakdown by hanging it up near their school’s swimming pool. The demonstration was timed carefully so that the bag would decompose by Earth Day on April 22.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the expected change did not occur, and the school’s newsletter The Singapore American reported that the bag remained “as good as new”.⁴⁵ This story was then picked up by the Business Times in its humour column.⁴⁶

Embarrassed by the bad publicity, The Body Shop pointed fingers at Kenwa. In an open letter to Kenwa, The Body Shop said that “We have experimented with exposing the bags to direct sunlight since we took delivery of the bags from you on March 6, 1990. Nothing has happened since. They look as resilient as the day they were brought in to us. Surely one might reasonably expect some sign of disintegration after all this time?”⁴⁷ Kenwa replied that their bags comprised 3 percent ecolyte polymers, which start disintegrating after 200 hours of exposure to sunlight. This was a “gradual process and not instantaneous” and would result in a plastic bag so brittle that it would be broken up by the elements of nature.⁴⁸ This did not satisfy sceptics, and supermarket giants like Jasons and Cold Storage decided against adopting Kenwa’s bags.⁴⁹

This is where SISIR intervened, to authoritatively parse the various differing scientific claims. The bags were sent to SISIR, where they were exposed to 200 hours of ultra-violet radiation in an accelerated ageing process in the laboratory. SISIR found that the bags did indeed become extremely brittle and published a report testifying to this. The managing director of Kenwa seized upon the report and declared that his company’s claims were vindicated.

However, the case spun on whether SISIR’s laboratory test was equivalent to real-life conditions. SISIR’s report itself conceded that “[w]ith the natural weathering process, a much longer period may be needed for the plastic bags to degrade.”⁵⁰ The Body Shop claimed that SISIR’s report did not support Kenwa’s claims, since the bags only disintegrated under UV radiation from a distance of one foot away, and not sunlight, as Kenwa had originally claimed. Therefore, it continued to charge Kenwa with misrepresentation.⁵¹

This instructive example shows the importance and limits of SISIR’s mediation. On one hand, SISIR could not end controversy through the imposition of a single uncontested interpretation of scientific facts. On the other hand, it displays SISIR’s scientific credibility – after all, neither party contested the credibility of SISIR or its testing, only what the correct interpretation of SISIR’s findings were.

Publicity

Publicising Standards and Standardisation

For standardisation to take off, its benefits had to be made known to the wider public. Hence, SISIR launched a variety of educational publicity campaigns. One of earliest was the Prosperity Through Quality and Reliability campaign of 1973, which had four objectives: promote quality-consciousness, inculcate a sense of pride among manufacturers and workers, project a positive image of Singapore-made goods, and upgrade the skills and technology necessary for ensuring quality.⁵²

The campaign was mooted by then Finance Minister Hon Sui Sen at the SMA Annual Dinner in June 1972, since he believed that “management, workers and the consuming public must be made even more critical of product quality if Singapore is to earn a wide and profitable reputation as a manufacturing nation”.⁵³ He called upon SISIR to work with SMA and the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) to organise a “Prosperity Through Quality and Reliability” or PQR campaign. The PQR Campaign was subsequently jointly organised by SISIR, NTUC, SMA, the Consumers’ Association of Singapore (CASE) and the Singapore Quality and Reliability Association. The chairman of SISIR, Dr Lee Kum Tatt, was chairman of the campaign’s organising committee, and Hon served as patron to the campaign.

Hon’s call for representatives of both labour (NTUC) and management (SMA) to be invested should not be missed. In the early 1970s, the government sought to establish a new political compact between labour and management, wherein class antagonism would be put aside for mutual benefit.⁵⁴ A campaign such as PQR, where labour and management came together to work towards the shared ideal of quality exemplified this new political ideal. Lee, for example, lauded how the campaign signified that “sectional interests have been submerged to be replaced by a common drive for national prosperity” – an indicator of “the maturity of our manufacturers and workforce.”⁵⁵

For Lim Hong Keat, chairman of the SMA, the campaign was “a typical example of many national efforts with trade unions, management and Government all pulling in the same direction.”⁵⁶ Devan Nair, Secretary General of the NTUC, went so far as to suggest that the aspiration for workers and entrepreneurs should be “Equality Through Quality,” since only a dedication to quality could deliver adequate economic success to transcend class divisions.⁵⁷

While the official campaign only ran between February and October of 1973, PQR Quality Control courses had begun earlier: an eight-week course for workers and supervisors was held in September 1972 and a course for managers held in November. Two foreign Quality Control courses – one in the Netherlands and one in Japan – were also offered by the Public Services Commission. For the young, a “know-your-industries” quiz and an essay competition were organised to promote awareness of local manufacturers.⁵⁸ More than 400 workers received Worker-of-the-Month Certificates.⁵⁹

Notable Singaporean designer William Lee designed a logo for the campaign. The “Q” was intentionally designed to resemble “a prize-winning rosette”, suggesting that carrying the PQR symbol was akin to a stamp of approval. Hundreds of manufacturers flew flags of the PQR logo at their factories to express their commitment to quality.⁶⁰

The PQR flag. Image reproduced from Industrial News and Research (Singapore: Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research, September 1972), 15. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RSING 607.25957)

To commemorate the launch of the campaign, William Lee also designed a set of four stamps. He explained that each stamp’s design was carefully chosen for strategic messaging: the 15 cents stamp used giant cutouts of the three major sponsors of PQR – SISIR, SMA, and NTUC – to emphasise how the united striving of “hardworking Singaporeans make the PQR concept a reality;” the rainbow colouring on the text of the 35 cents stamp was meant to “[project] scientific precision and cleanliness” while the rosette shape evokes “an approval effect;” the repetitious and colourful layout of the 75 cents stamp and the $1 stamp’s gold logo against a white background were intended to associate the Singapore brand with prestige and quality.⁶¹

Stamps released to commemorate the PQR campaign. Photograph by Sharad Pandian.

In all, industrialisation was seen as the way to prosperity, and quality-consciousness seen as necessary for industrialisation – as Hon pithily put it, “If Singapore is to succeed as a manufacturing nation, we must all be proud of the made-in-Singapore as being synonymous with quality and reliability, and ensure it remains so.”⁶² SISIR was understood to have a key role in this quest for quality – at the inauguration of the campaign, Hon announced that SISIR was going to be turned into an autonomous statutory board, with expanded powers and duties.⁶³ This transformation was accomplished a few months later through the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research Bill in July 1973.

The Standardised Consumer

As vital as overseas customers were, Singapore’s relative prosperity in the region meant that local consumers were also an important potential market. At the launch of the PQR campaign, the Executive Secretary of the newly minted CASE, Ivan Baptist, proclaimed that “CASE firmly believes that this Campaign will serve to eradicate once and for all the prejudices and suspicions about locally made products and reverse the current trend of purchasing more expensive imported products.”⁶⁴

Of the numerous approaches SISIR took to woo consumers, the most visually striking by far were the comics drawn by noted cartoonist Tan Huay Peng. Tan had been chief artist with the Straits Times, until the newspaper dropped political cartoons in August 1961.⁶⁵ He subsequently joined the EDB, where he continued his cartooning – SISIR periodically published pamphlets illustrated by him such as the 1976 Better Value for Money and the 1986 Buying for Specifications. A close reading of these pamphlets lets us trace how SISIR made a case for its importance in protecting consumer interests.

To build a case for customers to avail its services, SISIR first constructed an image of the vulnerable consumer. Customers apparently used heuristics like attractive packaging, cost and advertisements, to help them make their choices in a crowded marketplace.

Image reproduced from "Buying to Specifications" (Singapore: Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research, 1986), 3. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RCLOS 381.33).

Unfortunately, these heuristics were fallible, as consumers could not be certain about the provenance and quality of products. As the 1978 booklet Standards in Your Life pointed out, in an open economy like Singapore, “it is impossible for the consumer to judge visually whether paints are poisonous, the wiring of an electrical appliance is safe, a food product meets the health claims, and which brand gives better value for money.”⁶⁶

Images reproduced from "Buying to Specifications" (Singapore: Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research, 1986), 4. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RCLOS 381.33) and Better Value for Money: A Basic Guide for Consumers and Manufacturers (Singapore: SISIR, 1976), 29. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RCLOS 640.73 SIN)

Standards, however, could cut through this cloud of uncertainty by letting consumers know whether a product’s essential requirements had been met, allowing them to avoid both unsafe and overpriced alternatives.

Sticking to SISIR-approved products helped consumers avoid both regret and flatulence. Image reproduced from "Better Value for Money: A Basic Guide for Consumers and Manufacturers" (Singapore: SISIR, 1976), 22. (From National Library, Singapore, call no. RCLOS 640.73 SIN)

Apart from cartoons, another medium for publicising SISIR and standards was through educational television programmes. For instance, an episode of the 1976 programme Home Economics–A Vital Force aimed at Secondary 3 students was “Stretch Your Dollar” – an attempt at helping young people become responsible consumers. The episode imparts general advice such as being financially prudent, checking the authenticity of products, and comparing prices.

The show urges viewers to buy good-quality goods since “products of good quality last longer and require less repair” and then informs them that in Singapore, SISIR certifies the quality of various products. Clips of SISIR technicians testing various consumer goods were shown, ranging from checking for excessive radiation in television sets to testing for bacteria in sweetened condensed milk. By bringing to attention the potential harms of low-quality products, SISIR could position itself as safeguarding consumers from those dangers. The show ends by asking “Don’t you think it is wiser to buy local products with the SISIR label?”

Stills from TV show "Home Economics – A Vital Force" showing SISIR technicians testing various consumer goods. (Left) Testing for excessive radiation in television sets. (Right) Testing for bacteria in condensed milk. Images reproduced from " Home Economics – A Vital Force: Stretch Your Dollar (II)," 7 May 1976, video, 13:36, 16:11. (From National Archives of Singapore accession no. 2010011768)

The dangers that viewers were informed about, whether radiation or bacteria, were detectable only through scientific instruments. As the show makes clear, the promotion of quality-consciousness was never simply about sensitising people to the value of standards in the abstract – it was also about making people recognise and submit to the authority of a new set of professional actors who claimed expertise over standards and their appropriate deployment. The new export-oriented marketplace was a standardised space, coproduced alongside experts to educate, guide and authoritatively take charge. Both manufacturers and consumers benefited, as long as they participated in SISIR’s cycle of ever-improving standards and expectations.

How Successful Was SISIR?

Evaluating SISIR’s “success” is a complex task – even for a straightforward goal like economic growth, it is impossible to specify what portion of Singapore’s success is attributable to SISIR’s activities. However, the very heterogeneity of SISIR’s aims and projects can be studied to gauge the institution’s efforts in a range of ways.

One sign is the success of SISIR’s schemes. By 1974, the UN Industrial Development Organisation recognised the SISIR’s certification scheme as “well advanced and could serve as a model for most countries to follow”.⁶⁷ Even stronger evidence was the willingness of an increasing number of manufacturers to adopt SISIR’s various schemes. By the end of the 1980s, SISIR boasted that a total of 102 companies, manufacturing 972 products, held licences to use the SISIR quality mark.⁶⁸ In 1990 alone, 3,290 companies availed of its services.⁶⁹ The recognition of other standardisation bodies abroad of SISIR’s testing and certificates also speaks to the regard with which the institution was held. For example, SISIR was the first foreign agency in the world authorised to conduct inspection checks and award the Japan Industrial Standard mark.⁷⁰

Another approach is to consider the lack of open contestation about SISIR’s scientific authority – as the Body Shop bags example shows, even in the rare case when people chose to disagree with SISIR’s findings, they took issue with a particular test’s interpretation, not SISIR’s general authority or competence. SISIR’s decision not to mandate standards and to only incentivise their use seems to have rendered the institution largely unobjectionable. In his oral history account, Lee took pride in this fact: “I can boast for my 17 years in SISIR, not one single letter has been written to the press complaining about SISIR. Not one. Because it’s voluntary. I never passed any rules or forced anybody to come to me. You came out of your own free will. You think that we are useful. You pay on something we agreed on. So where is room for you to complain?”⁷¹

A final dimension to be considered is advertising. As goods began acquiring quality certification from SISIR, advertisers featured this quality endorsement in their advertisements. Government-issued publicity material can be expected to sing the praises of government services regardless of sentiment on the ground. However, advertisers pay money for advertising and so have an interest in putting forward the strongest case they can for their products. Thus, it is telling that they regarded the association with SISIR as positive and valuable.

Advertisements highlighting testing by SISIR. Images reproduced from “Advertisements Column 1,” Weekend East, 22 July 1988, 16 and “Advertisements Column 2,” Straits Times, 8 May 1998, 68. (From NewspaperSG).

For instance, a when JOVEN heater advertisement highlighted that it was “tested by SISIR”, it did not expand on what SISIR stood for or what its tests represented. Clearly advertisers thought SISIR and its role were established and authoritative enough to warrant consumer attention. The graph below tracks the frequency of advertising mentioning “SISIR” in English-language newspapers.

Source: Created by author, using data from NewspaperSG.

The popularity of such advertisements was particularly pronounced from the late 1980s, reaching a peak in 1994. The cause of this spike was the launch of SISIR’s certification scheme for the ISO 9000 standards for quality management in 1988.⁷² The scheme received special impetus when it was understood that ISO certification would be mandatory for exporting into the newly forming European Union.⁷³ By 1993, 400 different companies had obtained ISO 9000 certification from SISIR.⁷⁴

Advertisements highlighting testing by SISIR continued after 1996 – the year SISIR merged with the National Productivity Board to form the Productivity and Standards Board (PSB), bringing a close to SISIR. The stickiness of the SISIR label can be explained in part as advertisers using SISIR’s brand for credibility even after the institute ceased to exist – after all its reputation did not disappear overnight. It was also because SISIR’s labels were literally stuck onto merchandise, and therefore continued to be advertised and circulated with those goods on which they were pasted.

Certainly none of these measures, not even all of them taken together, indicate that SISIR was universally known, let alone beloved. But they make a compelling case that SISIR was taken seriously in its time and granted importance and authority in its domain. Now the question is whether SISIR will be given its well-deserved due in Singapore’s historical record.

About the author

Sharad Pandian graduated from Nanyang Technological University with a degree in physics before pursuing a Master of Philosophy in history and philosophy of science at the University of Cambridge as a Gates-Cambridge Scholar. Sharad is interested in the history of science and standardisation in Asia. He is a former Lee Kong Chian Research Fellow with the National Library, Singapore (2022–23).